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Abstract
What if it could be possible to convince a completely non-neoclassical economist of the
importance of Central Bank independence? The profession currently favors arguments in
favor of Central Bank independence that are based on the seminal work by Barro and
Gordon (1983 a,b), a model with naturally strong neoclassical assumptions. As a
consequence of this, the argument in favor of Central Bank independence routinely given
by economists is often not bought by those who question the validity of the neoclassical
assumptions. In this paper I argue that Central Bank independence can be beneficial for
society even when the economy is entirely non-neoclassical, that is, when workers are all
unionized, firms are completely cartelized and inflation arises as the result of distributive
struggles among capitalists and workers. This is so because it is the time-inconsistency
issue, and not the structure of the economy, that which generates the inflation bias that
Central Bank independence is set to eliminate.
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1. Introduction
The seminal work by Barro-Gordon (1983 a,b) model is routinely used to defend the
importance of Central Bank independence in modern economies. This well-known model
naturally has an entirely neoclassical structure, with its assumptions of perfect
competition and an expectations-augmented Phillips curve, which in turn embed the
assumptions of the neutrality of money, the existence of a natural rate of unemployment
and the undesirability of stabilization policies. For this, and other reasons, the argument
of Central Bank independence is not bought by those who question the validity of the
neoclassical assumptions.
What if it could be possible to convince a completely non-neoclassical economist of the
importance of Central Bank independence? This is of obvious importance as economists
worldwide are often set to give policy advice to many members of society that view
modern neoclassical economics with much suspicion.
In this paper I show that one can easily argue that Central Bank independence can be
beneficial for society even when the economy is entirely non-neoclassical, that is, when
workers are all unionized, firms are completely cartelized and inflation arises as the result
of distributive struggles among capitalists and workers.3 I show that the issues of
dynamic inconsistency studied by Barro and Gordon are just as important in this
‘structuralist’ (e.g., very non-neoclassical) economy as in a neoclassical economy and
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show that the inflation bias generated by dynamic inconsistency disappears in the
structuralist economy once Central Bank independence is in place.

2. The model
As in Barro and Gordon (1983 a,b) I set myself to build the simplest possible model
where the importance of Central Bank independence in an economy that does not satisfy
regular neoclassical assumptions can be demonstrated. The model is extraordinarily
simple and atypical. This is deliberate. The fact that this economy is very non-standard
makes it all the more interesting that the Barro-Gordon (1983 a,b) results can be
formulated and proved in it.
Consider an economy with one good and three agents: a group of workers, a group of
capitalists, and the monetary policy authority.
This model is composed of one period that is divided in three Stages. In the first Stage
workers define their inflation expectations and collectively impose their nominal wage
demands onto the group of capitalists. In the second Stage the monetary policy authority
define their expectations about the capitalists’ future pricing decisions and takes actions
that determine the level of nominal aggregate demand in the economy. In the third Stage
the capitalists collectively choose prices in the economy, therefore setting the price level.
I present the details below.
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2.1 The workers
Workers are all unionized and they collectively bargain their wage contracts with the
capitalists in the first Stage. Workers are set to defend a real wage equal to w0 and have
inflation expectations equal to πoe. (I assume that the initial price level P0 is equal to one).
I assume that the union imposes to the group of capitalists, at Stage 1, wage contracts that
guarantee a nominal wage for workers equal to
W = w0 (1+πoe).

(1)

Equation (1) adopts an extreme point of view according to which the labor union has all
the bargaining power in the wage discussions with the capitalists, as in Cukierman (1992,
Ch. 3).
2.2 The monetary policy authority
In this model the monetary policy authority takes steps that successfully determine the
level of nominal aggregate demand Y in the economy to strike a balance between
inflation and the level of real GDP. In particular, I model the monetary policy authority
as choosing at Stage 2 the level of Y to maximize
Y/(1+ π1) – (γ/2) π12,

γ > 0,

(2)

where π1 is the inflation rate and Y/(1+ π1) is the level of real GDP. The interpretation is
that the higher γ the more averse to inflation the monetary policy authority is. At the
moment of making the decision about the level of nominal aggregate demand the
authority takes nominal wages as given and forms expectations about the pricing
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decisions that the capitalists will make alter they see the course of action taken by the
monetary policy authority.
2.3 The capitalists
The capitalists are completely cartelized, and so they operate as a single monopolist.
They take nominal wages as previously bargained and the level of nominal aggregate
demand as given and choose at Stage 3 a price level P1 for the economy to maximize
Y/P1 – (W/P1) L(Y/P1),

(3)

where Y/P1 represents the level of output they produce (real GDP in this model), W/P1
represents real wages and L(Y/P1) represents the conditional labor demand function
evaluated at the production level Y/P1. I specialize the model further and assume that the
conditional labor demand function is given by L(y) =(1/3) y2. It is interesting to notice
that, given Y and W, when the capitalists choose P1 they are automatically determining
the level of real GDP, and the level of inflation π1. A noteworthy feature in this
formulation is the ability the capitalists have to also control the real wages in the
economy.4 Based on the above it is easy to see that, when the capitalists choose P1 they
also determine the distribution of income in this economy.

4

This fact distinguishes this model from one in which firms maximize individually and the aggregate arises from the
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choices.
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3. The ‘structuralist’ inflation bias
As usual, we begin studying the model backwards. The first order condition for the
maximization problem for the group of capitalists is
-Y/P12 + (1/3) WY2 3/P14 = 0

(4)

from which it follows that P1=(WY)1/2, namely, prices would rise with an increase in
nominal wages or an increase in the nominal aggregate demand. The inflation induced by
the behavior of capitalists is then equal to
π1=(WY)1/2-1.

(5)

It is interesting to notice that in this model an increase in Y raises the price level, the
level of real GDP and the total profits for the capitalists. At the same time, an increase in
Y depresses real wages and worsens the distribution of income, even though it increases
labor demand and the real wage bill.
Given this conduct, the monetary policy authority faces the following dilemma: raising Y
leads to a higher real GDP, which is good for everyone (although mostly for the
capitalists) but it also leads to a higher π1 (which depresses real wages). The monetary
authority then chooses at Stage 2 a level of Y to maximize
Y/(1+ π1) - γ/2 π12

(6)

subject to
π1=(WY)1/2-1.

(7)
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The first order condition for this problem is
(WY)-1/2-γW+γW1/2Y-1/2=0,

(8)

which leads the monetary policy authority to choose a level of nominal aggregate demand
given by
Y= (1+γW)2/(W3γ2).

(9)

Combining (5) with (9) we get a level of inflation in equilibrium given by
π1=1/(γW)

(10)

All this has very interesting implications: At the moment of wage bargaining, labor
unions will not take seriously any promise made by the capitalists not to raise prices
because it is clear to the unions that the capitalists know that the monetary policy
authority, through an increase in Y, will allow them to pass some of the cost increases
onto prices “to avoid a recession.” In light of this, the labor unions will not accept low
nominal wages in Stage 1 and will set the stage for something that is remarkably close to
what is known in the literature as a structuralist “cost-push” inflation.5 I will call this the
structuralist inflation bias that takes place in this model.
All this is easy to see in the model by combining (1) and (10), which leads to a level of
inflation in the economy equal to
π1=1/[γ w0 (1+πoe)]

(11)
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Hence, if inflation expectations for workers were too low (say, equal to zero), the pricing
response of the capitalists given the incentives of the monetary policy authority, would be
to produce a positive inflation level, equal to π1=1/(γ w0), which could not occur in
equilibrium. The resulting equilibrium inflation is determined when, in Stage 1, workers
set their inflation expectations πoe equal to π1,
πoe=π1

(12)

which means that the equilibrium inflation level π*1 is such that π*1(1+π*1)= 1/(γ w0), an
inflation level that is far from the “optimal” desired inflation level, as I show below.

4. Central Bank Independence
The question, then becomes: can an independent monetary policy authority eliminate the
structuralist inflation bias identified above? Following Barro and Gordon (1983 a,b) I
now model the monetary policy authority as one that is able to commit to a particular
policy, in particular a policy that will not be revised upon knowledge of the inflation
expectations of the economic agents. In the context of the model this independence
translates into a change in the order in which the events that determine inflation take
place.
I assume in this section that the monetary policy authority now commits in Stage 1 to a
given level of nominal aggregate demand Y. In Stage 2 unions take Y as given and set
their nominal wage demands. Finally, in Stage 3, the capitalists set prices in the economy,
taking Y and W as given.
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In this economy the capitalists continue to use the rule P1=(WY)1/2 for setting prices and
unions continue to set nominal wage demands equal to W= w0 (1+πoe). What is different
is the behavior of the monetary policy authority. Such authority now knows that it does
not take inflation expectation as given. In fact, it gets to affect inflation expectations by
committing to a given level of Y. As a consequence, the monetary policy authority gets to
affect the resulting inflation directly, through nominal demand management, and
indirectly, through expectations management.
Therefore, the monetary policy authority views the resulting inflation as the one that
comes from combining equations (1), (5) and (12), which produces an inflation level
equal to
π1=w0Y-1.

(13)

This expression summarizes the effect of aggregate nominal demand on the resulting
inflation. Now the monetary policy authority chooses in Stage 1 the level of Y to
maximize
Y/(1+ π1) - γ/2 π12

(14)

subject to
π1= w0Y-1.

(15)

The first order condition for this problem is
-2γ w02Y+2γ w0=0

(16)

which means that the monetary policy authority chooses a level of Y given by
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Y=1/w0,

(17)

Combining (15) with (17) allows us to compute the new equilibrium inflation level in the
model,
π*1= w0Y-1 = w0 (1/w0)-1 = 0,

(18)

an inflation level which is exactly zero.
Surprisingly, the independence of the monetary policy authority eliminates the
structuralist inflation bias by virtue of committing not to revise its policies upon
knowledge of the inflation expectations of the economic agents and the role they play in
creating “cost-push” pressures to the price level. This commitment keeps aggregate
demand to a level that eliminates all incentive for both the unions and the group of
capitalists to push wages or prices upwards. Hence, the structuralist inflation bias
completely disappears.

5. Inflation bias and the distributive struggle
A possible criticism of the model presented here is that the inflation bias developed above
arises simply from the fact that workers have rational expectations and not from any
distributive struggle inherent in the model. In this Section I show that this view is
incorrect: without the distributive struggle, the inflation bias disappears, even in the
presence of rational expectations on the part of the workers and a monetary authority that
cannot commit to a particular policy choice.
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To see this consider a model with a timing structure identical to that in Section 2, but
where the capitalists do not attempt (or are not able) to depress the real wages that the
workers are implicitly requesting. In other words, the capitalists collectively choose at
Stage 3 a price level P1 to maximize
Y/P1 – w0 L(Y/P1).

(19)

The first order condition for this problem is
-Y/P12 + (1/3) w0Y2 2/P13 = 0 ,

(20)

which leads to an inflation level of
π1= (2/3) w0Y-1.

(21)

It turns out that an economy in which the monetary authority cannot indirectly depress
real wages through the capitalist’s pricing rules is an economy that the monetary
authority has no incentives to inflate.
To see that this happens notice that the monetary authority now chooses at Stage 2 a level
of Y to maximize
Y/(1+ π1) - γ/2 π12

(22)

subject to
π1=(2/3) w0Y-1.

(23)

The first order condition for this problem is
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(8/9) w02Y- (4/3) w0γ =0,

(24)

which leads the monetary policy authority to choose a level of nominal aggregate demand
given by
Y= 3/(2w0)

(25)

Combining (25) with (21) we get a level of inflation in equilibrium given by
π1= (2/3) w0 (3/2w0)-1 = 0,

(26)

that is, an inflation level of zero. Since workers in Stage 1 can anticipate that zero
inflation is the inflation that will take place they will request nominal wages equal to w0.
In equilibrium, this is also the level of real wages that they will obtain.
Remark. That dynamic inconsistency problems reveal the presence of an underlying
conflict of interest is not new: it has been noted previously by Chari, Kehoe and Prescott
(1989) and Fischer (1980), among others.6 In this paper I simply exploit this fact to build
a simple structuralist model of the economy with the purpose of showing that
independence of the monetary policy authority would eliminate the inflation bias that the
distributive struggle embedded in the dynamic inconsistency problem generates. This is
an important thing to do because, as noted in the Introduction, it is believed by many of
those who are critical of neoclassical economic models that the independence of the
monetary authority is irrelevant for keeping inflation under control when the inflation is
generated by distributive struggles between capitalists and workers.

11

6. Further comparison of the three models
The model without distributive struggle clarifies further the nature of the inflation bias
that occurs in the structuralist economy discussed in Section 2. Table 1 shows the
equilibrium outcomes for the three models: the model without monetary authority
commitment and distributive struggle (model 1), the model with monetary authority
commitment and distributive struggle (model 2), and the model without monetary
authority commitment and no distributive struggle (model 3).
Three facts stand out from the examination of Table 1. First, that the output level in
model 3 is higher than that of model 2. Second, that income is equally distributed in
model 3, as opposed to models 1 and 2. Third, that inflation, and also real output, are
decreasing in γ.

No
commitment

Commitment

No commitment

+

+

+

distributive
struggle

no distributive
struggle

π*1>0

0

0

Real GDP

1/(γ w0)

1/w0

3/(2w0)

Real wages

w0

w0

w0

2/3

2/3

½

1/3

1/3

½

distributive
struggle
Inflation

Capitalist’s
share

income

Labor’s Income share

Table 1: A comparison of the three models
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All these facts, in this structuralist setup, hinge on whether the capitalists, through choice
of prices, can affect the level of real wages. If they can’t (as in model 2, where the
workers are able to adjust their inflation expectations) or won’t (as in model 3, where the
capitalists accomodate the nominal wages to their own pricing behavior), inflation is
zero, as there is no channel through which the monetary authority can affect output.
Such vehicle, in model 1, is the decline in real wages that is produced by the capitalist’s
choice of pricing rule. This pricing rule is more aggressive when there is a distributive
struggle because, at the margin, part of the real revenue that is lost from raising prices is
offset by lower marginal costs of production due to the corresponding decline in real
wages that follows from raising prices.
This effect is a distinctive feature of the model presented above, and is absent from the
traditional neoclassical or new Keynesian macroeconomic models. In the end all this
translates into the capitalists having an incentive to curb production to allow prices to be
high, real wages to be low, and to tilt the distribution of income in favor of the capitalist
group. In the model without distributive struggle this effect is not present, and a higher
real GDP, zero inflation and a more equitable distribution of income arises in
consequence.
Finally, as expected, the lower the inflation aversion parameter in model 1, the higher the
inflation bias will be, and the higher the observed real output.
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7. Conclusions
In this paper I have shown that the ability of the monetary policy authority to commit to a
particular set of policies that cannot be affected by the inflation expectations of the
economic agents completely eliminates inflation in an economy where all agents are
unionized and all owners of firms act as a single monopolist.
To be sure, this model is not intended to be a realistic depiction of any actual economy.
The model is extraordinarily simple and atypical. This is deliberate. Its purpose is to
serve as a simple albeit extreme benchmark in which to make the point that Central Bank
independence can be of tremendous importance even when the economy does not satisfy
traditional neoclassical assumptions such as perfect competition and market clearing
prices. In fact, this economy is not even New Keynesian in that the distinguishing feature
of this model is not the presence of nominal rigidities in an otherwise neoclassical world
but instead that wages and prices are direct choices made independently by the union of
workers and the cartel of firms to increase their income share.
It was already known (c.f. Clarida, Gali and Gertler, 1999) that New Keynesian
economies also exhibit an inflation bias similar to that of Barro and Gordon (1983 a,b).
The contribution of this paper has been to show that this inflation bias is also present in
very non neoclassical (e.g., structuralist) economies as well.
That this is so reveals that it is the time-inconsistency issue, and not any particular
neoclassical or non-neoclassical economic structure, that which generates the inflation
bias that Central Bank independence is set to eliminate. This has very important
implications for the design of economic policy institutions, as Central Bank independence
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is often viewed as a conservative, neoclassically motivated policy prescription. This point
of view no longer seems necessary.
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